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Information security (InfoSec) has ontologically been characterised as an order 
machine. The order machine connects with other machines through interrupting 
mechanisms. This way of portraying InfoSec focuses on the correct placement of 
machine entities to protect information assets. However, what is missing in this view is 
that for the InfoSec we experience in everyday practice, we are not just observers of the 
InfoSec phenomena but also active agents of it. To contribute to the quest, we draw on 
Heidegger’s (1962) notion of equipment and propose the concept of equipment-as-
experience to understand the ontological position of InfoSec in everyday practice. In this 
paper we show how equipment-as-experience provides a richer picture of InfoSec as 
being a fundamental sociotechnical phenomena. We further contend using an example 
case to illustrate that InfoSec equipment should not be understood merely by its 
properties (present-at-hand mode), but rather in ready-to-hand mode when put into 
practice. 
Keywords:  Information Security, Equipment-as-experience, Ontology, Heidegger. 
Introduction 
Engagement with information security (InfoSec) requires knowledge of three types of equipment: 
technical (e.g. firewall), formal (e.g. policies) and informal (e.g. security culture) (Dhillon 2007). These 
equipment have distinct characteristics and yet they are not stand-alone, but rather engage with human 
entities to form a cohesive structure of InfoSec (Baskerville and Dhillon 2008; Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen 2007). To this end, Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) argue that there is a lack of ontological 
understanding of InfoSec, and recommend the order machine metaphor in the form of relational ontology 
using Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) philosophical concepts of machine, coupling, interruption and 
territory. In this metaphor, InfoSec is portrayed as a machine that connects with various entities to 
maintain order in what the authors call ‘data territories’.  
In this paper, we interpret the ontology of the order machine as a classification of facts about InfoSec 
properties rather than presenting the ontology of InfoSec, even though it references specific ontological 
direction. The ontological direction that manifests in the order machine is the same as that which 
considers entity in a universal manner, i.e. as within Cartesian representationalism (see e.g. Mingers 
2001; Riemer and Johnston 2014). In this direction, the revealing of InfoSec is, as Heidegger (1977, 
p.322) puts it, about ‘the challenge that sets upon man to order the actual as standing-reserve in 
accordance with the way it shows itself’, and is indeed the same ontology that explains the existence of 
computers and other technological artefacts. Being nothing but the order of standing-reserve inevitably 
puts man in a position to regulate the revealing, insofar as it stays in the position of securing the 
characteristics of the machine. Here we see signs of what Heidegger calls concealment—the machine 
conceals itself in terms of what and how it is. The machine, represented as a standing-reserve are, 
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according to Heidegger made disposable in the sense that it is easily ordered and arranged. Within the 
InfoSec landscape, machines can be replaced with other more efficient machines when new security 
regulations appear.  The machine reveals itself to us humans when we have gained knowledge about its 
purpose of existence. Heidegger suggests a structure that contains three ways of revealing technology. 
Present-at-hand mode in which humans have to explicitly encounter the properties of the technology, 
ready-at-hand mode in which humans already have knowledge how the technology function, and third as 
human engagement with other humans and technology. The revelation, in Heidegger’s view, is thus that 
the machine is what it can become—a socio-technical constitution that involves technology, human 
agents, and organisational practices. Admittedly, the advantage of the order machine is the network with 
connected entities that it presents as a venture in conceptual modeling. The machine ontology however 
overlooks humans’ experience and their role as active security producers, which is a cornerstone in socio-
technical perspectives on InfoSec. Hence, the question arises: What would be the characteristics and 
structure of a relational ontology of InfoSec that incorporate human experiences?  
To contribute to the ontological understanding of InfoSec, we reconceptualised InfoSec in relational to 
human experience rather than entity terms. This required a shift in our thinking to Martin Heidegger’s 
notion of equipment (Heidegger 1962; Heidegger 1977). Equipment, as per Heidegger, is not just a 
specific tool, but a system of tools in use in a particular context. It is in context that things make sense to 
us and fit into our lives. ‘It is the overall scheme in which we can act, produce, think and be’ (Polt 1999, 
p.52). The relevance of Heidegger’s philosophy to the information systems field has been suggested 
previously (Whitley and Introna 1998). Several attempts have been made to expand on Heidegger’s 
relational view using his terminologies, including ‘anxiety’, ‘familiarity’, ‘gestell’, ‘enframing’ and 
‘worldliness’. The most recent attempt is the article ‘Rethinking the place of the artefact in IS using 
Heidegger’s analysis of equipment’ (Riemer and Johnston 2014). This insightful and critical account of 
philosophy’s importance to the field conceptualises IT as equipment interwoven with other equipment, 
user practices and individual identities. Interestingly, while Heidegger’s thoughts have been 
problematised in information systems research, we find no studies focusing on Heidegger’s relevance in 
InfoSec research.  
In this paper, by applying Heidegger’s philosophy and following (Riemer and Johnston 2014), we argue 
for the understanding of InfoSec as equipment-as-experience. This approach to InfoSec means revealing 
it through an understanding of equipment as a basic experience. According to Heidegger (1962), 
experiences emerge deliberately and non-deliberately through everyday engagement with equipment. We 
propose that equipment-as-experience consists of experience variance, rather than a unified 
configuration, and that these variances are made obvious in the enactment of InfoSec equipment 
Experience variance in our view refers to the different, inconsistent and controversial positions of InfoSec 
as a phenomenon that both requires special attention and simultaneously creates experiences during the 
use of InfoSec equipment. Our view is thus distinct from the common strategy in explaining variance as a 
formalisation of human behaviour based on the assumption that a causal relationship exists between 
technological and mental properties (Riemer and Johnston 2014). Our argument is further that 
configuration unity employs a configuration perspective that centres on the analysis of possible 
configurations of information technologies (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013), and is the result of the view 
of conceptual modelling as a representation of a real-world system. For instance, Weber (2003) use the 
example of a email system that represents states and events that relate to the sender of the message. 
Similarly, InfoSec contains states and events that regulate computer users access to information bases. 
We consider configuration unity and experience variance as two fundamental characteristics of InfoSec. 
These two characteristics stress the socio-technical constitution of InfoSec by guiding technical 
performance and shaping organisational InfoSec practises (Almusharraf et al. 2015; Hedström et al. 2010; 
Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013; Siponen and Willison 2009; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007; 
Warkentin et al. 2011). Using the notion of equipment-as-experience, we reconcile the characteristic of 
Infosec and argue that the reconciled view can reveal the nature of InfoSec better than the Cartesian 
position can (Riemer and Johnston 2014).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: we first embed equipment-as-experience within Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Next, we review the InfoSec literature to provide a basis for an ontological discussion. 
Subsequently, we describe and analyse equipment-as-experience using one example case. Finally, we 
discuss our reconceptualisation of InfoSec and conclude the paper. 
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Positioning equipment-as-experience 
To examine InfoSec’s ontological status, we must situate it within three ways of revealing equipment-as-
experience (Heidegger 1962): first, the present-at-hand mode of using a tool; second, the ready-at-hand 
mode, in which the equipment explicitly points to a purpose; and third, as human engagement wherein 
the human is not an observer but an active agent, skilfully coping with the equipment.  
The main question that Martin Heidegger (1962) asked in his seminal work Being and Time was, ‘what is 
the meaning of being of any entities’. He proposed that understanding the meaning of being of something 
means to reveal it. Likewise, in order to reveal the ‘being of something’ more clearly, we have to place that 
thing within a particular context. Heidegger stated that understanding the meaning of being doesn’t mean 
enquiring about entities; rather, we have to pay attention to equipment as it reveals itself in use. 
Heidegger asserts that ‘entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the 
acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained’ 
(Heidegger 1962, p.251). For example, studying a firewall and analysing its properties does not mean one 
has uncovered its being; however, when we put this device into use in a particular context, it becomes part 
of its experiences (i.e. the equipment is given meaning through its performance in a network, switch or 
router). As Heidegger puts it, ‘the less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it 
and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is—as equipment’ (Heidegger 1962, p.98). 
Heidegger refuted the Aristotelian notion of ‘being’ in terms of substance with properties, just as he 
rejected the Cartesian notion of ‘being’ as thinking substance (human subjects) and extended substance 
(non-human objects). Instead, he proposed three modes of being: Dasein (human), present-at-hand 
(objects) and ready-to-hand (equipment). The Dasein (our) mode of existence is different from that of 
other entities because we involve ourselves in activities, are social and ‘inhabit a world, we are capably 
engaged in a meaningful context. Our world is the context in terms we understand ourselves, and within 
which we become who we are’ (Polt 1999, p.30). Heidegger expressed that being-in-the-world means we 
are thrown into a context where we have a place in a meaningful whole; here we deal or encounter with 
equipment and other Daseins. Regardless of our personal and cultural differences, we continuously 
actively engage in the world by generating experiences in our struggle for identity. 
To encounter equipment in ready-to-hand mode means that we understand something not by observation 
but by use. We use the equipment ‘in-order-to’; we get something done for the sake of ‘towards-which’ 
someone (a Dasein). For example, if we consider security controls (both technical and organisational) as 
equipment, InfoSec is meant to protect information assets for the sake of securing the continuity of 
business activities, so that stakeholders (Dasein) can maintain their business identity (in its widest 
meaning). In ready-to-hand mode, all entities involved form the ‘referential totality’ and do not remain as 
individual items of equipment, but rather as a referential whole without parts (Harman 2010). We can 
deal with entities in present-at-hand mode as well. This involves the reflective observation of any object. 
For example, we observe the properties of different technical and organisational controls from a distance 
rather than from its use in practice. Objects can be present-at-hand when broken, and become obtrusive 
once they no longer function effectively. Breakdown does not always refer to permanent breakdown 
(obstructive), however (one could, for example, simply be unable to find a tool); it also refers to temporary 
breakdown (obstinate) such as when a part of a tool is missing or malfunctioning (conspicuous), or the 
tool is not appropriate (Dreyfus 2001). As such, ‘breakdowns’ in InfoSec should not be taken as technical 
failures only, as they can also be failures of formal and informal controls. 
It is important to carefully recognise that present-at-hand and ready-to-hand are not two different types 
of entities. ‘Instead, all entities oscillate between these two separate modes: the cryptic withdrawal of 
readiness-to-hand and the explicit accessibility of present-at-hand’ (Harman 2010, p.3). According to 
Heidegger, ‘the present-at-hand way of being in which entities are encountered as objects with properties 
is a derivative way that humans can relate to the world (for example to reflect mindfully) that is grounded 
ultimately in our practical understanding of the work (for example through using equipment)’ (Riemer 
and Johnston 2014, p. 277). In this context, we can say that ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are both 
different modes of InfoSec. However, the present-at-hand mode is derived from ready-to-hand and not 
the other way round. 
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In summary, as shown in Figure 1, we are always engaged with other Dasein and equipment (ready-to-
hand entities) in our everyday existence to construct or reconstruct our ‘world’. We are already thrown 
into the world as ‘being-in-the-world’ and have a pre-understanding (familiarity) of this context through 
our involvement in everyday practice; however, this understanding can be vague. Therefore, any entity we 
encounter takes on meaning based on its familiarity to our existing practice. However, if we encounter 
entities that are unfamiliar to us (or defined by context-independent properties) (Riemer and Johnston 
2014), then the entities are simply present-at-hand entities and not equipment for us. Consequently, we 
cannot comprehend their practical meaning. For example, when we find security controls designed 
without an understanding of practical context, it is difficult for us to know what they are and what they are 
for. We must examine the tangible properties of the security controls against our own familiarity. This 
leads to ambiguity in placing the controls within any practices that we know; the controls may turn out to 
be unsuitable in our particular context. The implications of Heidegger’s analysis to the security 
practitioners is that the entity we deal with is not defined by its properties (present-at-hand mode), but is 
understood by its place in practice (ready-to-hand). ‘That makes intelligible the object (i.e. equipment) 
and influences which properties show up for us as meaningful in a situation. The being of such objects 
(what they are) is thus grounded in intelligibility (how we understand them practically) and not in 
substantiality (their material properties)’ (Riemer and Johnston 2014, p.279). Through this engagement 
in practice with other Daseins and equipment, we maintain our identity and keep on exploring the 
possibilities of Dasein’s reality. The meaning in this context is that of either security personnel or users 
will not experience the equipment in totality if they cannot see how it serves to preserve their identity. 
 
Figure 1.Equipment (adopted from Richard Polt 1999, p. 54) 
 
InfoSec in an equipment-as-experience perspective 
InfoSec has been conceptualised in socio-technical terms. The technical level consists of the specific 
performance of the security equipment, and the socio-organisational level that both shapes and is shaped 
by this performance (Almusharraf et al. 2015; Hedström et al. 2010; Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013; 
Siponen and Willison 2009; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007; Warkentin et al. 2011). As the socio-
technical account of InfoSec centres around interactions between security technology and people (c.f. 
Cordella 2006; Latour 1987; Orlikowski 2007), the abundance of technical, formal and informal security 
equipment will generate distinct experiences that are co-constructed relationally through direct 
engagement in daily activities (D'Aubeterre et al. 2008; Dhillon 2007; Siponen and Vance 2014; Siponen 
and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007; Warkentin and Willison 2009). 
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Note that equipment has a strong association with experiences. Experiences envision a way forward in the 
shaping of a comprehensive security practice within an organisation (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; 
Siponen 2001). This shaping is dependent on revealing, however, and revealing is challenging; the effort 
required of equipment—in our case the InfoSec technology—is unreasonable, so says Heidegger in ‘The 
question concerning technology’ (Heidegger 1977). This is because the in-built capacity of InfoSec 
technology is not sufficient to secure access to the layers below and to other artefacts within IT 
infrastructures, nor to shape the InfoSec culture of the organisation. It is against this setting of challenges 
that Vuorinen and Tetri’s (2012) order machine operates. Independent machines are connected by way of 
covering their controlling attributes through the act of interrupting. It is in this mode of operation that the 
order machine reveals itself through its performance. It is a kind of mechanised performance of covering 
that in Heidegger’s view means the unlocking of protected information bases and the exposure of 
resources. Heidegger (1977) formulates the challenge in the following: 
Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing and switching about are ways of 
revealing. /…/ The revealing reveals to itself its own manifold interlocking paths, 
through regulating their course. This regulation itself is, for its part, everywhere 
secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the revealing 
that challenges (p.322). 
In literature wherein technical security equipment is at the centre of attention, a number of machines 
function as standing-reserves in the regulation and security of the IT domain within an organisation. 
Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) recognised that organisations are occupied with several different machines and 
present a structural view accompanied by a flowchart that sequences connections between different 
machines. These connections are part of a configuration logic that seeks to unify the machines towards a 
single goal—to protect data territories. The order machine metaphor is however not a fixed position of 
InfoSec as would have been the case if it was presented as an autonomous tool. Through connections the 
order machine is part of an on-going relationship with humans and other entities. Furthermore, when 
they turned to the material content, Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) discovered that a single machine is indeed 
multiple machines. Where Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) see multiple entities, we see functional features of 
the machine. For example, in order to secure communication, a cipher machine functions by 
interconnecting categories of cryptographic algorithms to ensure data confidentiality or data integrity 
(Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). Similarly, a firewall is a flow detection machine that applies its 
regulative functionality to control data traffic (Hedström et al. 2010). 
How is the efficiency of these machines monitored? The effective operations of technical security 
equipment are typically explained as a function of rule-based structures and their associated role-based 
responsibilities (i.e. formal security equipment) (Dhillon 2007). The formal equipment is characterised by 
the support and management of the resources needed to govern technical equipment (Stahl et al. 2008). 
While the formal security equipment includes tools such as checklists, risk analysis and standard security 
frameworks (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Saleh et al. 2007), its practise is that of technical 
systematisation in the sense that it tends to reinforce present-at-hand equipment. Several security 
management techniques have been proposed with the purpose of controlling and creating stable security 
environments. These include security management models (Dhillon 2007; Wylder 2004), information 
security governance (Moulton and Coles 2003), security policy compliance (Thomson and von Solms 
2006) and agile security design (Siponen et al. 2005). Given the ultimate objective of the proposed 
techniques—to ascertain the integrity of strategic information resources—we frame formal security 
equipment as a reconnaissance machine (Mookerjee et al. 2011; Ransbotham and Mitra 2009). 
Essentially, the responsibility of the reconnaissance machine is to execute descriptive accounts with 
prescribed management-in-action protocols to render secure IT milieus. It is argued that such 
descriptions are meant to better facilitate the utilisation of security tools (Hsu 2009; Kolkowska and 
Dhillon 2013; Siponen and Vance 2010; Vance et al. 2012).  
While technical and formal equipment help clarify the setting-upon challenges, we still need to reconcile 
the subordinate role of users and the distortion that the order machine brings upon them. Turning to the 
literature for examples may shed some light on this particular gap. The user is subjected to the 
orderability of InfoSec, but order may never be actualised. Faced with the quest for order, users may 
develop expectations that conflicts with the expectations of those (e.g. InfoSec managers) who possess the 
authority to enforce InfoSec regulation in the workplace. These expectations (sometimes perceived 
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expectations) leave little room for users to comprehend the InfoSec frameworks they face every day. The 
literature describes this lack of understanding as a potential source of malicious security behaviours. It is 
acknowledged in the received literature that this problem occurs as users’ intention to obey to given 
security frameworks largely depends on their motivation to comply with the frameworks (Myyry et al. 
2009). These programmes have been criticised as delivering weak content (Lacey 2010). Puhakainen and 
Siponen (2010) suggest that compliance can be achieved if users systematically utilise the cognitive 
processing of information received through training activities. Interestingly, despite the possible impact of 
training programmes, Stanton et al. (2005) maintain that improvement in these areas also brings a 
greater likelihood of writing down one’s password, or even sharing passwords, which indicates a lack of 
InfoSec awareness (Dinev and Hu 2007). Hence, users may develop misaligned InfoSec use patterns in 
the course of enacting InfoSec regulation because of discrepancies between emerging experiences and 
expected experiences (Backhouse and Dhillon 1996). 
In their attempt to clarify the ontological position of the order machine, Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) 
unfortunately regard the human agent more as a source of distortion than an active agent of InfoSec. In 
their view, the machine can foster good security behavior and in that respect the machine are assigned the 
task to influence the human self. For example, by interrupting information access it is expected that 
human agents will internalise password policies and avoid compromising the integrity of information 
systems.  Technology is, however, a mode of revealing according to Heidegger, and so is the order 
machine. But what does it reveal that is relevant to the status of InfoSec. It reveals, in accordance with 
Cartesian representationalism, a structure of entities which Heidegger (1977) refers to as ‘the basis of the 
ordering of the orderable’ (p.323). In Heidegger’s view such a structure of entities is similar to what 
Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) call assemblage of order machines. This position represents the context of 
interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of InfoSec that appears to be something at 
human command.   
In our view of InfoSec, the human (an active agent) cannot be excluded from the picture. A precise 
organisation of order invites decidedly rational approaches to InfoSec by assuming that it is possible to 
deterministically match technology with human intentions. Such a prescriptive approach is likely to 
manifest InfoSec as a predictable and stable entity. We propose that when we engage with InfoSec 
equipment, different experiences will emerge. For example, when security engineers are occupied with 
configuring InfoSec equipment, they are attuned to the present-at-hand mode. When the same engineer 
explains why and how that equipment functions within the overall InfoSec practice without turning to its 
material content, he or she is undergoing a ready-to-hand experience. So, in the pathway of unitary 
actions, engineers could develop a unifying experience. The same analogy holds for the user as well. When 
the login process to systems is interrupted due to password problems, the user is forced to direct his or 
her attention to the present-at-hand mode. When the password works, the user can engage in work-
related activity. Experiences thus emerge in oscillation between these two separate modes of engagement 
because the actors have developed familiarity with pathways of action (Harman 2010). 
A narrative and interpretation of equipment-as-experience 
For this project, we examined a published case study in which behavioural security (BSec) technology was 
introduced in a nursing home (Harnesk and Lindström 2012), to illustrate how equipment-as-experience 
can inform the study of InfoSec ontology. The research design in the original case was qualitative and data 
collection method was in-person interviews. Data analysis had a focus on how organizational actors made 
sense of BSec and how they engaged in the emerging relationship between organizational security 
objectives, technology, and users. Our approach in reinterpreting the case was to identify the emergent 
experiences among stakeholders and how these experiences oscillate between present-at-hand mode and 
ready-at-hand mode and how stakeholders engaged with each other during the introduction phase.  The 
decision to introduce the security technology was taken by the elderly care unit in the municipality of 
Luleå, Sweden. The municipality sponsored the introduction of the new security application to this facility 
in response to undesirable security behaviour. Four different work roles were involved in the narrative: IT 
manager, local IT manager, care unit manager and care staff. Table 1 illustrates examples of the managers’ 
experiences in pursuing the goal of configuring InfoSec (Con_Exp) and the users’ experiences of engaging 
with it (Use_Exp).  
In the case, security managers reported that their main goal was to ensure secure behaviour while using 
the department’s computer resources. The initiators of the introduction, the IT manager at the social 
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department and the IT manager at the IT service unit in the organisation, stressed that their privacy 
regulations in elderly care necessitated a change in security behaviour. Accordingly, the users were 
informed of the privacy issues and were asked to sign a confidentiality agreement when employed. While 
the involved managers contended that awareness of privacy matters was high in the organisation, there 
was still a risk of computer abuse due to an observed reluctance to complete logout procedures, which 
enabled people to use the computers under someone else’s user credentials.  
 
With the introduction of the BSec platform, security management wanted to substantially improve the 
protection of patient records. Compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks is of outmost importance 
in organisations of this type. The technical justification for moving from traditional subject-object security 
approaches to BSec was the possibility of automated authentication. The BSec technology in question also 
featured effective monitoring and control of user behavioural patterns by producing performance 
statistics. Monitoring before BSec involved the manual checking of log files, including cross-checking the 
logs for breaches. The intention was to use the new technology to collect and analyse behavioural data 
during run-time [Con_Exp 1]; however, the technology was also expected to raise security awareness 
among the staff. Interestingly, the latter was more or less taken for granted due to an understanding that 
the software was self-instructive. Along with this basic assumption about BSec’s perceived utility, the 
managers strongly believed its mechanisms could protect computer resources and secure the privacy of 
care receivers [Con_Exp 2]. Indeed, the BSec technology substantially improved monitoring activity 
through an automated authentication process across all care applications [Con_Exp 3]. 
 
Besides the obvious technical leverage, there was also an anticipation of the usefulness of the security 
technology. The nursing staff anticipated substantial impact from BSec on work performance, 
productivity and effectiveness [Use_Exp 1] as they previously had complained about the significant 
number of computer-related problems affecting the use of healthcare applications. One major issue was 
that a single computer had to serve up to 40 people on reporting days. Considering the overall computer 
situation in the nursing home as explained by the user group, there were clear signs of potential 
maladaptive security behaviour. For example, when having trouble with passwords, employees were 
expected to call local support for further assistance. However, this was not efficient according to the staff 
because of long response times to get a new password from the support function. The nursing staff ‘solved’ 
this by sharing user credentials between each other [Use_Exp 2]. There was indeed a need for better 
security policy compliance among the staff. 
 
With the introduction of BSec, the security system remained invisible in the sense that employees were 
not intruded upon by system properties. It was agreed that the usefulness of security procedures had 
indeed increased after the introduction of BSec [Use_Exp 3]. Once enrolled, the employees confirmed 
that their experience of the system was better than expected prior to introduction. Two of the employees 
even expected that the general service level of the new system would increase after some time of use. This 
was due to high expectations among employees that the system would, more or less, entail changed and 
improved work processes. While managers uniformly distributed responsibilities to prepare for the new 
security system, employees initially expected other benefits from the system, which in reality the 
technology could not deliver upon.  
 
One interesting aspect is that although the three managers agreed that the organisation had suffered from 
maladaptive security behaviour, they exhibited conflicting views in preparing for the security software’s 
introduction. This in turn affected the communication of instructions to work groups. While the initiators 
of the security software introduction used a push approach when persuading the work group to participate 
in the project, there were no interactions between management levels and employees after the decision for 
the introduction was made. It was anticipated that the identification and verification features of the BSec 
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Table 1. Equipment-as-experience 
Configuration domain (Con_Exp) 
1. BSec can automatically collect, store and continuously analyse data about employees’ 
computer behaviour 
2. BSec can be configured to immediately signal computer abuse 
3. BSec reduces InfoSec administrative tasks due to lesser control of authentication 
character 
User domain (Use_Exp) 
1. Improvement in work performance, productivity and effectiveness  
2. Sharing passwords make work easier 
3. Work life became easier as the single sign-on authentication procedure in BSec 
resulted in seamless identification and less intrusive security controls 
 
Table 1. Equipment-as-experience 
 
After some time using BSec, the nursing staff acknowledged their intention to continue using the security 
software over alternative means such as having colleagues enter healthcare information in the security 
software on their behalf. BSec thus encouraged new security patterns among employees. 
Interpreting equipment-as-experience 
In the configuration domain, equipment-as-experience exists as a roadmap for goal-directed action at any 
security event occurring within the IT infrastructure. In regard to the user domain, we have defined 
experience variance as the different, inconsistent and controversial positions of InfoSec, a phenomenon 
that demands explicit attention while being coped with and simultaneously creates experiences during 
use. Here, the order machine regards configuration only as goal-directed action, whereas equipment-as-
experience subsists as a significant whole of connections between present-at-hand and ready-at-hand 
items. If we bring instances of formal, informal and technical equipment into a meaningful web of 
experiences, they will make sense in an organisation. As Heidegger tells us, ‘our using or manipulating of 
any individual item of equipment remains oriented towards some equipmental context’ (Heidegger 1962, 
p.403). Therefore, equipment is either usable or in use and involved in a certain activity; in Heidegger’s 
terms, the towards-which why and for-the-sake-of-which who. Those involved with BSec in the examined 
case study experienced InfoSec differently, but always in a way that was relevant to their respective work 
tasks; this is obvious in the two kinds of experiences displayed in Table 1. For security managers, the 
introduction of InfoSec in the nursing home was justified by the support it brought to securing the 
enactment of software applications, IT infrastructures and networks (i.e. the functional objects that 
represent the present-at-hand status of InfoSec). For computer users, the introduced InfoSec was simply a 
means to complete work tasks and support care receivers’ overall safety and security.   
The equipment-as-experience position of InfoSec revealed inconsistencies between groups, as there was 
no strategy in place to identify assumptions about BSec within the nursing staff group. An interesting 
controversy to InfoSec is the assumption that the BSec introduction would lead to improvements in work 
performance, which was never intended by the decision makers. The nursing staff reconciled this with 
sharing passwords continuously between each other. As it was clear that the BSec introduction required 
staff to begin behaving in accordance with new InfoSec regulations, the introduction was essentially a 
change project.  While the two characteristics, configuration unity and experience variation help clarify 
the basic configuration role of InfoSec, and the different, inconsistent and controversial positions of 
InfoSec, these characteristics also manifest experiences that emerge in the enactment of InfoSec. Thus 
experiences emerge in both the configuration domain and in the user domain. The experiences emerged 
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in our case through the identification of improved technical equipment, i.e better protection trough BSec, 
and that the nursing staff adapted to BSec and eventually accepted BSec as the technical security 
foundation within their nursing practice.  
In the course of implementing InfoSec, professionals must demonstrate how computer users can utilise 
InfoSec within their own contexts. Security equipment is intertwined with user practices in the 
continuation of business activities. As such, InfoSec properties appear to users as meaningful in actual use 
situations. The identity of such experiences (what they are) is thus grounded in the way we understand 
them practically and not in their material properties. The use of equipment-as-experience to understand 
InfoSec is related to but differs in important ways from the order machine metaphor. While both 
metaphors are consistent with safeguarding organisational information assets, the order-machine focuses 
on rules, boundaries and limitations through its neutral appearance in the regulation and control of data 
territories. To achieve this, Vuorinen and Tetri (2012) suggest that territories with order machines that 
connect to each other are visible patterns of distinct InfoSec goals. Whatever these goals may be in 
practice, they always involve three fundamental security processes: identification, authentication and 
authorisation. In this case, the security technology performs these processes with present-at-hand 
equipment that, without association to a web of meaning, will be seen as features of connectivity (i.e. it 
will carry out a precise organisation of order). In order for the association to take hold, the present-at-
hand equipment must instead connect to continuous activity rather than specific entities. Thinking in 
terms of equipment-as-experience enables the exploration of different equipment and how they become 
intertwined to shape InfoSec over time. In Heidegger’s view, this represents the skilful coping with 
equipment that professionals use in making sense of a flow of a directed activity (Dreyfus 2001). The 
sense-making of directed activities leads to knowing what others are doing in the process of securing and 
safeguarding organisational information assets, without explicitly knowing the purpose of all types of 
security measures. 
Discussion 
We began this paper to understand the ontology of InfoSec. We observed that Vuorinen and Tetris’ (2012) 
idea of InfoSec is oriented towards computational entities to safeguard data territories. Vuorinen and 
Tetri suggest their conceptualisation of InfoSec should be regarded as relational ontology. Our 
examination of their approach to InfoSec in the form of the order machine reveals InfoSec by existence 
rather than InfoSec as existence, namely in present-at-hand mode, with explicit attention towards the 
configuration of assemblages of connected entities. The order machine thus takes priority over security 
professionals and users’ actual experiences when InfoSec comes into everyday activity. We found the 
irresistibility of ordering intriguing and elaborated on some limitations of the order machine by drawing 
on Heidegger’s notion of equipment. To that end, we propose equipment-as-experience as a concept to 
understand the relationship between experiences generated from engagement with technical, formal and 
informal security equipment. One fundamental limitation with the order machine metaphor that our 
approach overcomes is its neutrality towards singular actors’ conceptions about InfoSec. For example, the 
being or nature of InfoSec is defined as an interrupter that maintains order in the security chaos that 
comes from inside or outside. We find the order machine to represent a foundation of entities needed to 
provide the secure interactive base to human agents. Once again, we see this relationship as existence; i.e. 
the engagement with equipment that will generate distinct experiences co-constructed relationally in daily 
activities. Our understanding of InfoSec is thus distinct from not only the order machine but also from 
InfoSec as a ‘business enabler’ (Sherwood et al. 2005), ‘security-insulator’ (Pieters 2011), ‘security-by-
experiment’ (Pieters et al. 2015) and ‘emancipator’ (Talib and Dhillon 2010; Thapa and Harnesk 2014), 
as these approaches may conceal the way InfoSec generates comprehensive experiences of technical, 
formal and informal equipment. 
Besides the neutrality towards human agents, another shortcoming of the order machine ontology is the 
vagueness in which different modes of equipment are treated. The order machine focuses more on 
towards-which (in this context, information protection), and the human aspect gives less attention to for-
the-sake-of-which (for whom). To understand both aspects, we need to comprehend how people 
experience InfoSec in practice. The example case illustrates how similar phenomena can be experienced in 
different modes (e.g. Con_Exp and Use_Exp). As Heidegger states, the essence of technology is in the 
revealing or double revealing of a designer’s intention and user experience. In this context, the double 
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revealing can work as a feedback loop to the configuration domain in terms of understanding how users 
appropriate the technology, and to the users’ domain in identifying the latent affordances of the 
technology.  
This study also dissects the sociotechnical phenomena in general, and InfoSec in particular. For example, 
some scholars argue that InfoSec holds a strong association between socio-technical elements in that the 
integrity of an organisation as a whole is the main focus (Hedström et al. 2010; Kolkowska and Dhillon 
2013; Siponen and Vance 2014; Siponen and Willison 2009; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007; 
Warkentin et al. 2011). It is also suggested that where the technological frames (assumptions, 
expectations and knowledge) backed by values, cultures and beliefs in key groups (managers, 
technologists and users) within an organisation are significantly different, difficulties and conflict around 
the development, use and change of technology may arise (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). We argue that the 
ontological positioning of InfoSec as equipment-as-experience reveals experiences in different levels that 
can have different effects on the phenomena, as illustrated in the example case. In this example, the same 
InfoSec instance was experienced differently across the configuration and user domains in terms of how 
the experiences reframed the InfoSec system. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated a previously overlooked phenomenon; namely, the everyday understanding 
(equipment-as-experience) of InfoSec. By drawing on well-acknowledged InfoSec concepts (technical, 
formal and informal), we provided an alternative understanding of the nature and scope of InfoSec. The 
concepts proved to be a suitable and appropriate basis on which to suggest that a relational ontology has 
the capability to cultivate a holistic understanding of the area. The findings illustrate that the ‘being’ of 
security entities should not be understood merely by their properties (present-at-hand mode), but rather 
that when put into practice (ready-to-hand mode), information security reveals itself. The notion of 
equipment-as-experience thus provides a way to handle the challenge of maintaining the benefit that a 
wider scope of InfoSec can generate in organisational InfoSec practices. The implications of the 
equipment-as-experience perspective to security practitioners is that the entity they deal with is not 
defined by its properties (or present-at-hand mode), but rather requires skilful coping with security 
equipment to understand its place in practice (or ready-to-hand mode). 
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